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Abstract
Subjects are asked to report their confidence in their own decisions regard-
ing the Ellsberg three color urn. Subjective confidence is measured via a 5
point Likert scale. Surprisingly, subjects are more confident in their answer
for the more complicated two color question, compared to the simple one color
question. This is robust across a wide range of experimental contexts.
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Ellsberg (1961) pointed out that human behavior can be at odds with the assump-
tions of subjective expected utility. Following his obeservation, a large literature has
worked on theoretically relaxing the crucial sure-thing principle. Ellsberg urn exper-
iments are often used as an empirical justification of these models.1 In the Ellsberg
three color experiment, subjects are asked to take two decisions with regard to an
urn filled to 1
3
with balls of color A, and filled to 2
3
with balls of colors B and C. It
is unknown to the subjects how many balls of color B and C are exactly in the urn,
they only know that the total of balls of color B and C adds up to 2
3
of all balls in
the urn. Subjects then have to take two bets on the outcome of two separate draws,
with replacement, from the urn (compare table 1). In the first, which I will call
one color question, subjects can chose to win the price if the drawn ball is of color
A, or to win the price if the ball is of color B. In the second, which I will call two
color question, subjects can chose to win a price if the balls is of [color A or color
C], or to win a price if the ball is of [color B or color C]. Subjects who bet on the
“risky” color(s) with known proportions twice are labeled ambiguity averse, subjects
who bet on the “ambiguous” color(s) twice are labeled ambiguity loving. Otherwise,
subjects are called ambiguity neutral. Typically, subjects are forced to take one bet
for each question and their preferences are assumed to be strict.
This is problematic. Subjects may be indifferent and answer randomly. Their pref-
Table 1: Bets in the Ellsberg three color experiment
10 balls 20 balls
Color A Color B Color C
one color question
Risky win lose lose
Ambiguous lose win lose
two color question
Ambiguous win lose win
Risky lose win win
1See Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2014) for a recent survey of Ellsberg experiments.
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erences may be stronger in some cases than in others. To shed light on this, subjects
are asked for their subjective confidence in their own decision.
In the following experiments, subjects report their confidence in their own choice
via a five point Likert scale, ranging from “not confident at all” (0) to “very confi-
dent” (4). The data is taken from three experiments run by Dominiak and Duersch
(2015), henceforth DD, Dominiak, Duersch, and Lefort (2012), henceforth DDL, and
Duersch, Roemer, and Roth (2013), henceforth DRR. Previously, DDL found that
confidence is higher when adhering to the axioms of consequentialism and dynamic
consistency and when acting ambiguity averse, while DRR report that subjects who
are more consistent in their choices across urns are also more confident.
In all treatments, subjects are more confident in their choices in the two color ques-
tion. For all treatments but one, the difference is significant at 1% level when tested
with a two-sided sign rank test (compare table 2).
Note that the treatments take place under very different conditions2: Treatment S
Table 2: Confidence
Paper Treatment Confidence
1 color
question
Confidence
2 color
question
Obs. sign rank
test
p-value
DD S 2.35 3.02 40 .000
DD M 2.45 3.03 33 .008
DD B 2.58 2.77 31 .153
DDL - 2.40 3.11 90 .000
DRR short 2.01 3.03 34 .000
- short′ 2.30 2.99 38 .000
DRR long(normal) 2.12 2.79 105 .000
DRR long(delayed) 2.13 2.81 108 .000
DRR long(experienced) 2.16 2.80 102 .000
2For more details and instructions, see the original papers.
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in DD corresponds to the standard way the Ellsberg task is administered. The urn
was filled by the experimenters and nothing was mentioned in the instructions about
how it was filled. In treatments M and B the urn was filled by another subject with
either malevolent or benevolent incentives towards the decision maker. In the exper-
iment by DDL, the urn was filled by the experimenters, but subjects had to answer
two additional questions with respect to the urn. Importantly, the order of the one
color and two color question was reversed in DDL, such that this experiment serves
as a control for a possible order effect. In the experiment by DRR, subjects had to
decide for multiple urns, four in treatment short/short′ and six in treatment long.3
Treatment long itself is divided into two urns with immediate payment (normal),
two urns where payment was delayed by two months (delayed), and two urns which
were administered with a two months delay and were subjects had previous experi-
ence with the task via the other treatments (experienced). In each case, the average
confidence is reported. The finding is robust across these different setups.
While there is never a significant correlation between confidence and choice in the
one color question, there is a significant positive pairwise correlation between confi-
dence and chosing the non-ambiguous bet in four cases for the two color question.
For treatments S, long(experienced), and short, the correlation is significant at 1%
level. However, it is only significant at 10% level for treatment M and insignificant
for all other treatments.
Why are subjects showing a higher confidence in their choices in the two color ques-
tion, despite this being the more “complicated” one, using two colors for payoff?
Perhaps, due to the simplicity of the one color question, subjects deliberate less on
this question compared to the more complex two color question, and subjects use
length of deliberation as a metric to judge their own confidence. It is also possible
that subjects confuse ’confidence in their own choices’ with ’probability of winning
the price’. Further research is needed to explain the cause of this empirical regularity.
3Treatment short′ uses a dataset that is not used in DRR. The design is identical to short, with
the exception of payment. In short′ all urns are paid. In short a randomly chosen urn out of each
pair of urns is paid.
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